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Abstract- Phishing websites are forged web pages that are 
created by malicious people to mimic web pages of real websites 
and it attempts to defraud people of their personal information. 
Detecting and identifying Phishing websites is really a complex 
and dynamic problem involving many factors and criteria, and 
because of the subjective considerations and the ambiguities 
involved in the detection, Fuzzy Logic model can be an effective 
tool in assessing and identifying phishing websites than any other 
traditional tool since it offers a more natural way of dealing with 
quality factors rather than exact values. In this paper, we present 
novel approach to overcome the ‘fuzziness’ in traditional website 
phishing risk assessment and propose an intelligent resilient and 
effective model for detecting phishing websites. The proposed 
model is based on FL operators which is used to characterize the 
website phishing factors and indicators as fuzzy variables and 
produces six measures and criteria’s of website phishing attack 
dimensions with a layer structure. Our experimental results 
showed the significance and importance of the phishing website 
criteria (URL & Domain Identity) represented by layer one, and 
the variety influence of the phishing characteristic layers on the 
final phishing website rate. 
 
Keywords- Phishing; Fuzzy Logic; risk assessment; phishing 
website criteria 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
     PHISHING websites are forged web pages that are created 
by malicious people to mimic web pages of real websites. 
Most of these kinds of Web pages have high visual similarities 
to scam their victims. Some of these kinds of Web pages look 
exactly like the real ones. Unwary Internet users may be easily 
deceived by this kind of scam. Victims of phishing Web pages 
may expose their bank account, password, credit card number, 
or other important information to the phishing Web page 
owners. The impact is the breach of information security 
through the compromise of confidential data and the victims 
may finally suffer losses of money or other kinds. Phishing is 
a relatively new Internet crime in comparison with other 
forms, e.g., virus and hacking. More and more phishing Web 
pages have been found in recent years in an accelerative way 
[7]. The word phishing from the phrase “website phishing” is 
a variation on the word “fishing.” The idea is that bait is 
thrown out with the hopes that a user will grab it and bite into 
it just like the fish. In most cases, bait is either an e-mail or an 
instant messaging site, which will take the user to hostile 
phishing websites [10].  
Phishing website is a very complicate and complex issue to 
understand and to analyze, since it is joining technical and 
social problem with each other for which there is no known 
single silver bullet to solve it entirely. The motivation behind 
my study is to create a resilient and effective method that uses 
fuzzy logic to quantify and qualify all the website phishing 
characteristics and factors in order to detect phishing websites 
to assess whether phishing activity is taking place or not. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the 
literature review and related work and Section 3 shows the 
theory and methodology of the website phishing risk 
assessment model with its system design and implementation. 
Section 4 reveals the experiments and results of the fuzzy 
phishing website risk assessment model and then conclusions 
and future work are given in Section 5. 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND RELATED WORK 
A. Literature Review 
     Phishing website is a recent problem, nevertheless due to 
its huge impact on the financial and on-line retailing sectors 
and since preventing such attacks is an important step towards 
defending against website phishing attacks, there are several 
promising approaches to this problem and a comprehensive 
collection of related works. In this section, we briefly survey 
existing anti-phishing solutions and list of the related works. 
One approach is to stop phishing at the email level [3], since 
most current phishing attacks use broadcast email (spam) to 
lure victims to a phishing website [21]. Another approach is to 
use security toolbars. The phishing filter in IE7 [19] is a 
toolbar approach with more features such as blocking the 
user’s activity with a detected phishing site. A third approach 
is to visually differentiate the phishing sites from the spoofed 
legitimate sites. Dynamic Security Skins [5] proposes to use a 
randomly generated visual hash to customize the browser 
window or web form elements to indicate the successfully 
authenticated sites. A fourth approach is two-factor 
authentication, which ensures that the user not only knows a 
secret but also presents a security token [6]. However, this 
approach is a server-side solution. Phishing can still happen at 
sites that do not support two-factor authentication. Sensitive 
information that is not related to a specific site, e.g., credit 
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card information and SSN, cannot be protected by this 
approach either [22]. 
 Many industrial antiphishing products use toolbars in Web 
browsers, but some researchers have shown that security tool 
bars don’t effectively prevent phishing attacks. In  [5] Rachna 
Dhamija and Doug Tygar proposed a scheme that uses a 
cryptographic identity-verification method that lets remote 
Web servers prove their identities. However, the proposal 
requires changes to the entire Web infrastructure (both servers 
and clients), so it can succeed only if the entire industry  
supports it. Reference [13] also proposed a tool to model and 
describes phishing by visualizing and quantifying a given 
site’s threat, but this method still wouldn’t provide an 
antiphishing solution. Another approach is using certification, 
e.g., (microsoft.com/mscorp/twc/privacy/spam), [14], [15], 
[17], [1]. A recent and particularly promising solution [8] 
proposes to combine the technique of standard certificates 
with a visual indication of correct certification; a site-
dependent logo indicating that the certificate was valid, would 
be displayed in a trusted credentials area of the browser. A 
variant of web credential is to use a database or list published 
by a trusted party, where known phishing web sites are 
blacklisted. For example Netcraft antiphishing toolbar 
http://toolbar.netcraft.com/ prevents phishing attacks by using 
a centralized blacklist of current phishing URLs. Other 
Examples include Websense, McAfee’s anti–phishing filter, 
Netcraft anti-phishing system, Cloudmark SafetyBar, 
Microsoft Phishing Filter [16]. The weakness of this approach 
is its poor scalability and its timeliness. Note that phishing 
sites are cheap and easy to build and their average lifetime is 
only a few days.  
APWG provides a solution directory at (Anti-Phishing 
Working Group) [2] which contains most of the major 
antiphishing companies in the world. However, an automatic 
antiphishing method is seldom reported. The typical 
technologies of antiphishing from the User Interface aspect are 
done by [5] and [22]. They proposed methods that need Web 
page creators to follow certain rules to create Web pages, 
either by adding dynamic skin to Web pages or adding 
sensitive information location attributes to HTML code. 
However, it is difficult to convince all Web page creators to 
follow the rules [7].  In [12], [7], [13], the DOM-based [20] 
visual similarity of Web pages is oriented, and the concept of 
visual approach to phishing detection was first introduced. 
Through this approach, a phishing Web page can be detected 
and reported in an automatic way rather than involving too 
many human efforts. Their method first decomposes the Web 
pages (in HTML) into salient (visually distinguishable) block 
regions. The visual similarity between two Web pages is then 
evaluated in three metrics: block level similarity, layout 
similarity, and overall style similarity, which are based on the 
matching of the salient block regions [7]. 
B. Main Characteristics of phishing websites. 
      Evolving with the antiphishing techniques, various 
phishing techniques and more complicated and hard-to-detect 
methods are used by phishers. The most straightforward way 
for a phisher to defraud people is to make the phishing Web 
pages similar to their targets. 
Actually, there are many characteristics and factors that can 
distinguish the original legitimate website from the forged 
faked phishing website like Spelling errors, Long URL 
address and Abnormal DNS record [16]. The full list is shown 
in table I which will be used later on our analysis and 
methodology study.  
 
C. Why using Fuzzy Logic? 
     Fuzzy logic has been used for decades in the engineering 
sciences to embed expert input into computer models for a 
broad range of applications. It offers a promising alternative 
for measuring operational risks [18]. The fuzzy logic approach 
provides more information to help risk managers effectively 
manage assessing and ranking website phishing risks than the 
current qualitative approaches as the risks are quantified based 
on a combination of historical data and expert input. The 
advantage of the fuzzy approach is that it enables processing 
of vaguely defined variables, and variables whose 
relationships cannot be defined by mathematical relationships 
[23]. Fuzzy logic can incorporate expert human judgment to 
define those variable and their relationships.  
 
 
III. THEORY & METHODOLOGY 
 
A. The Phishing Website Risk Assessment Model  
1) Fuzzification 
      The approach described here is to apply fuzzy logic 
modeling to assess website phishing risk on the 27 
characteristics and factors which stamp the forged website. 
The essential advantage offered by fuzzy logic techniques is 
the use of linguistic variables to represent Key Phishing 
Characteristic Indicators and relating website phishing 
probability. In this step, linguistic descriptors such as High, 
Low, Medium, for example, are assigned to a range of values 
for each Key Phishing Characteristic Indicators. Valid ranges 
of the inputs are considered and divided into classes, or fuzzy 
sets. For example, length of URL address can range from 
‘low’ to ‘high’ with other values in between. We cannot 
specify clear boundaries between classes. The degree of 
belongingness of the values of the variables to any selected 
class is called the degree of membership; Membership 
function is designed for each Phishing characteristic indicator, 
which is a curve that defines how each point in the input space 
is mapped to a membership value (or degree of membership) 
between [0, 1]. Linguistic values are assigned for each 
Phishing indicator as Low, Moderate, and High while for 
Phishing website risk rate as Very legitimate, Legitimate, 
Suspicious, Phishy, and Very phishy (triangular and 
trapezoidal membership function). For each input their values 
ranges from 0 to 10 while for output, ranges from 0 to 100. 
An example of the linguistic descriptors used to represent one 
of the Key Phishing Characteristic Indicators (URL Address 
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Long) and a plot of the fuzzy membership functions are 
shown in figure 1. The fuzzy representation more closely 
matches human cognition, thereby facilitating expert input and 
more reliably representing experts’ understanding of 
underlying dynamics [4]. 
 
 
Figure 1. Input variable for Long URL Address component 
 
The same approach is used to calibrate the other 26 Key 
Phishing Characteristic Indicators.  
2) Rule Evaluation. 
      Having specified the risk of website phishing and its Key 
Phishing Characteristic Indicators, the logical next step is to 
specify how the website phishing probability varies as a 
function of the Key Phishing Characteristic Indicators. Experts 
provide fuzzy rules in the form of if…then statements that 
relate website phishing probability to various levels of Key 
Phishing Characteristic Indicators based on their knowledge 
and experience. 
Website phishing experiments, Anti phishing tools analysis, 
web surveys, phishing quizzes and detailed questionnaire to 
assess factors, which collectively characterise the website 
phishing. A detailed checklist table is based on the types of 
phishing source and style, and weights assigned to them 
according to their effectiveness and influence. 
 
3) Aggregation of the rule outputs.  
 
     This is the process of unification of the outputs of all rules. 
Combining the membership functions of all the rules 
consequents previously scaled into single fuzzy sets (output).  
 
4) Defuzzification. 
 
     This is the process of transforming a fuzzy output of a 
fuzzy inference system into a crisp output. Fuzziness helps to 
evaluate the rules, but the final output this system has to be a 
crisp number. The input for the defuzzification process is the 
aggregate output fuzzy set and the output is a number. This 
step was done using Centroid technique because it is most 
commonly used method of defuzzification.  
The output is website phishing risk rate and is defined in fuzzy 
sets like ‘very phishy’ to ‘very legitimate’. The fuzzy output 
set is then defuzzified to arrive at a scalar value. 
C.  System Design 
The design based on multi-level fuzzy approach for risk 
analysis [23]. Website phishing detection rate is performed 
based on six criteria: URL & Domain Identity, Security & 
Encryption, Source Code & Java script, Page Style & 
Contents, Web Address Bar And Social Human Factor as 
shown in Table I, which also shows that there are different 
number of components for each criterion, five components for 
URL & Domain Identity, Source Code & Java script, Page 
Style & Contents, Web Address Bar, four components for 
Security & Encryption and three components for Social 
Human Factor. Therefore, there are twenty seven 
components in total.  
There are three layers on this website phishing fuzzy model as 
shown in figure 2. The first layer contains only URL & 
Domain Identity criteria with a weight equal to 0.3 for its 
importance; the second layer contains Security & Encryption 
criteria and Source Code & Java script criteria with a weight 
equal to 0.2 each; the third layer contains Page Style & 
Contents criteria, Web Address Bar criteria And Social 
Human Factor criteria with a weight equal to 0.1 each. The 
six criteria have been prioritized according to their importance 
using weights as concluded from the Website phishing 
experiments, case studies, Anti phishing tools analysis, web 
surveys, phishing quizzes, detailed questionnaire and phishing 
expert’s feedback. 
Using the IP Address
Abnormal Request URL
Abnormal URL of Anchor URL & Domain Identity
Abnormal DNS record
Abnormal URL
Anomalous SSL certificate
Conflicting certification authority
Abnormal Cookie Security & Encryption
Inconsistent Distinguished Names (DN)
Redirect pages Layer Two
Straddling attack
Pharming Attack Source Code Java script
Using onMouseOver to hide the Link
Server Form Handler (SFH)
Website Phishing 
Rate
Spelling errors
Copying website
Using forms with “Submit ” button Page Style & Contents
Using Pop-Ups windows
Disabling Right-Click
Long URL address
Replacing similar characters for URL 
Adding a prefix or suffix Web Address Bar Layer Three
Using the @ Symbol to Confuse
Using Hexadecimal Character Codes
 Emphasis on security and response
 Public generic salutation Social Human Factor
Buying Time to Access Accounts
Structure of the fuzzy inference overall system to evaluate website phishing rate  
Figure 2. Structure of the fuzzy inference overall system to evaluate website 
phishing rate. 
 
Website Phishing Rating = 0.3 * URL & Domain Identity 
crisp [First layer] + ((0.2 * Security & Encryption crisp)+(0.2 
* Source Code & Java script crisp)) [Second layer] + ((0.1 * 
Page Style & Contents crisp) +(0.1 * Web Address Bar crisp) 
+ (0.1 * Social Human Factor crisp)) [Third layer]   
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TABLE I. COMPONENTS AND LAYERS OF WEBSITE PHISHING 
CRITERIA. 
Criteria N Component Layer No. 
1 Using the IP Address 
2 Abnormal Request URL 
3 Abnormal URL of Anchor 
4 Abnormal DNS record 
URL & 
Domain 
Identity 
 
(Weight = 0.3) 5 Abnormal URL 
 
Layer One 
 
 
Sub weight = 
0.3 
1 Using SSL certificate 
2 Certificationauthority 
3 Abnormal Cookie 
Security & 
Encryption 
 
(Weight = 0.2) 4 Distinguished Names 
Certificate(DN) 
1 Redirect pages 
2 Straddling attack 
3 Pharming Attack 
4 Using onMouseOver to hide the 
Link 
Source Code 
& Java script 
 
(Weight = 0.2) 
 
5 Server Form Handler (SFH) 
 
Layer Two 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub weight = 
0.4 
1 Spelling errors 
2 Copying website 
3 Using forms with “Submit” button 
4 Using Pop-Ups windows 
Page Style & 
Contents 
 
(Weight =0.1) 
 5 Disabling Right-Click 
1 Long URL address 
2 Replacing similar characters for 
URL  
3 Adding a prefix or suffix 
4 Using the @ Symbol to Confuse 
Web Address 
Bar 
 
(Weight = 0.1) 
 
5 Using Hexadecimal Character 
Codes 
1 Much emphasis on security and 
response 
2  Public generic salutation 
Social Human 
Factor 
(Weight = 0.1) 
3 Buying Time to Access Accounts 
 
 
 
Layer Three 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sub weight = 
0.3 
Total Weight 1 
D. The Rule Base 
1) The Rule Base1 for layer 1. 
     The rule base has five input parameters and one output and 
contains all the “IF-THEN” rules of the system. For each entry 
of the rule base, each component is assumed to be one of three 
values and each criterion has five components.  
 
TABLE II.  SAMPLE OF THE RULE BASE 1 STRUCTURE AND 
ENTRIES FOR URL & DOMAIN IDENTITY CRITERIA 
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) 
1 Low Low Low Low Low Genuine 
2 Low Low Low Low Mod. Genuine 
3 Low Low Low Mod. Mod. Doubtful 
4 Low Low Low Mod. high Doubtful 
5 Low Low Mod. Mod. high Fraud 
6 Low Mod. Mod. Low high Fraud 
7 Mod. Low high Mod. high Fraud 
8 high Mod. Low Low Low Doubtful 
9 Low high Low Low Mod. Doubtful 
10 high Mod. high high Low Fraud 
Therefore, the rule base 1 contains (35) = 243 entries. The 
output of rule base 1 is one of the website phishing rate fuzzy 
sets (Genuine, Doubtful or Fraud) representing URL & 
Domain Identity criteria phishing risk rate. A sample of the 
structure and the entries of the rule base 1 for layer 1 are 
shown in Table II. The system structure for URL & Domain 
Identity criteria is the joining of its five components (Using 
the IP Address, Abnormal Request URL, Abnormal URL of 
Anchor, Abnormal DNS record and Abnormal URL), which 
produces the URL & Domain Identity criteria (Layer one).  
 
2) The Rule Base for layer 2. 
      In Layer 2, there are two inputs, which are (Security & 
Encryption and Source Code & Java script) and one output. 
The system structure for Security & Encryption criteria is the 
joining of its four components (Using SSL certificate, 
Certification authority, Abnormal Cookie and Distinguished 
Names Certificate(DN)) using Rule base 1, which produces 
Security & Encryption criteria. The system structure for 
Source Code & Java script criteria is the joining of its five 
components (Redirect pages, Straddling attack, Pharming 
Attack, Using onMouseOver to hide the Link and Server Form 
Handler (SFH)) using Rule base 1, which produces Source 
Code & Java script criteria. The structure and the entries of the 
rule base for layer 2 are illustrated in Table III. The system 
structure for layer 2 is the combination of two website 
phishing criteria (Security & Encryption and Source Code & 
Java script), which produces rule base 2. The rule base 
contains (32) = 9 entries and the output of rule base 2 is one of 
the website phishing rate fuzzy sets (Legal, Uncertain or Fake) 
representing Layer Two criteria phishing risk rate. 
 
TABLE III. THE RULE BASE 2 STRUCTURE AND ENTRIES FOR 
LAYER TWO 
Rule 
Security & 
Encryption 
Source Code & 
Java script 
Phishing  Risk 
(Layer Two) 
1 Genuine Genuine Legal 
2 Genuine Doubtful Legal 
3 Genuine Fraud Uncertain 
4 Doubtful Genuine Legal 
5 Doubtful Doubtful Uncertain 
6 Doubtful Fraud Uncertain 
7 Fraud Genuine Uncertain 
8 Fraud Doubtful Uncertain 
9 Fraud Fraud Fake 
3) The Rule Base for layer 3. 
      In Layer 3, there are three inputs, which are: the Page 
Style & Contents, Web Address Bar and Social Human Factor 
which is the output from layer 3, and one output. The system 
structure for Page Style & Contents criteria is the joining of its 
five components (Spelling errors, Copying website, Using 
forms with “Submit” button, Using Pop-Ups windows and 
Disabling Right-Click) using Rule base 1, which produces 
Page Style & Contents criteria. The system structure for Web 
Address Bar criteria is the joining of its five components 
(Long URL address, Replacing similar characters for URL, 
Adding a prefix or suffix, Using the @ Symbol to Confuse and 
Using Hexadecimal Character Codes) using Rule base 1, 
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which produces Web Address Bar criteria. The system 
structure for Social Human Factor criteria is the joining of its 
three components (Much emphasis on security and response, 
Public generic salutation and Buying Time to Access 
Accounts) using Rule base 1, which produces Social Human 
Factor criteria. 
A sample of the structure and the entries of the rule base for 
layer 3 are shown in Table IV. The system structure for layer 3 
is the combination of Page Style & Contents, Web Address 
Bar and Social Human Factor, which produces rule base 3. 
The rule base contains (33) = 27 entries and the output of rule 
base 3 is one of the website phishing rate fuzzy sets (Legal, 
Uncertain or Fake) representing Layer Three criteria phishing 
risk rate. 
 
TABLE IV. THE RULE BASE 3 STRUCTURE AND ENTRIES FOR 
LAYER THREE 
R
ul
e 
 Page Style 
& Contents 
Web 
Address Bar 
Social Human 
Factor 
Phishing  Risk 
(Layer Three) 
 
1 Genuine Genuine Genuine Legal
2 Genuine Doubtful Fraud Uncertain
3 Genuine Fraud Fraud Fake
4 Doubtful Genuine Genuine Legal
5 Doubtful Doubtful Doubtful Uncertain
6 Doubtful Fraud Doubtful Uncertain
7 Fraud Genuine Genuine Legal
8 Fraud Doubtful Doubtful Uncertain
9 Fraud Fraud Fraud Fake
4) The Rule Base for final website phishing rate. 
In the website phishing rule base last phase, there are three 
inputs, which are: layer one, layer two and layer three, and one 
output which is the rate of the phishing website. The structure 
and the entries of the rule base for website phishing rate are 
shown in Table V. The system structure for is the combination 
of layer one, layer two and layer three, which produces final 
website phishing rule base. The three dimensional plots of this 
structure is shown in Figure 3 using MATLAB. The rule base 
contains (33) = 27 entries and the output of final website 
phishing rule base is one of the final output fuzzy sets (Very 
Legitimate, Legitimate, Suspicious, Phishy or Very Phishy) 
representing final phishing website rate. 
 
TABLE V. THE WEBSITE PHISHING RATE RULE BASE STRUCTURE 
AND ENTRIES FOR FINAL PHISHING RATE 
R
ul
e 
 URL & 
Domain 
Identity   
Layer Two Layer 
Three  
Final Website 
Phishing Rate 
1 Genuine Legal Legal Very Legitimate
2 Genuine Legal Uncertain Legitimate
3 Genuine Legal Fake Suspicious
4 Genuine Uncertain Legal Suspicious
5 Genuine Uncertain Uncertain Phishy
6 Genuine Uncertain Fake Phishy
7 Genuine Fake Legal Suspicious
8 Genuine Fake Uncertain Phishy
9 Genuine Fake Fake Very Phishy
10 Doubtful Legal Legal Legitimate
11 Doubtful Legal Uncertain Suspicious
12 Doubtful Legal Fake Phishy
13 Doubtful Uncertain Legal Suspicious
14 Doubtful Uncertain Uncertain Suspicious
15 Doubtful Uncertain Fake Phishy
16 Doubtful Fake Legal Phishy
17 Doubtful Fake Uncertain Phishy
18 Doubtful Fake Fake Very Phishy
19 Fraud Legal Legal Suspicious
20 Fraud Legal Uncertain Suspicious
21 Fraud Legal Fake Phishy
22 Fraud Uncertain Legal Suspicious
23 Fraud Uncertain Uncertain Suspicious
24 Fraud Uncertain Fake Phishy
25 Fraud Fake Legal Phishy
26 Fraud Fake Uncertain Very Phishy
27 Fraud Fake Fake Very Phishy
 
 
Figure 3. Three-dimensional plots for final phishing rate 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
 
     Clipping method [9] is used in aggregating the 
consequences and the aggregated surface of the rule 
evaluation is defuzzified using Mamdani method [11] to find 
the Center Of Gravity (COG). Centroid defuzzification 
technique shown in equation (1) can be expressed as where x* 
is the defuzzified output, µi(x) is the aggregated membership 
function and x is the output variable.  
 
------------------ (1) 
     The proposed intelligent Phishing website detection system 
has been implemented in MATLAB 6.5. The results of some 
input combinations are listed in Tables VI, VII and VIII.   
The final phishing website risk rating will be balanced (50%) 
representing a “suspicious website”, when the Layer one 
(URL & Domain Identity) of the phishing website risk criteria 
has 10 input values which indicate High phishing indicator 
and all other layers have the value of zero inputs as shown in 
Table VI. Same result can be made when all phishing website 
risk criteria’s representing by the three layers have middle (5) 
input values which indicate Mod. phishing indicator. These 
results shows the significance and importance of the phishing 
website criteria (URL & Domain Identity) represented by 
layer one especially when compared to the other criteria’s and 
layers. Table VII shows that when the Layer one and Layer 
two of the phishing website risk criteria has middle (5) input 
values which indicate Mod. phishing indicator and other third 
Layer has the value of 10 input values which indicate High 
phishing indicator, the final phishing website risk rating will 
be reasonably high (65%) representing a “phishy website”, 
which means that there is a Good guarantee that the website is 
forged phishy website. This result clearly shows that even if 
some of the website phishing characteristics or layers are not 
very clear or not definite, the website can still be phishy and 
forged and users should be aware when dealing with it 
especially when other phishing characteristics or layers are 
obvious and clear. 
 6
TABLE VI. FIVE HIGHEST (10) FOR LAYER ONE  AND ALL OTHERS 
LOWEST (0). 
Layer Two Layer Three 
Co
m
p 
Layer 
One 
URL & 
Domain    
Security 
& 
Encrypt 
Source 
Code & 
Java 
Page 
Style & 
Contents 
Web 
Address 
Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
% 
Website 
Phishing  
Rating 
1 10 0 0 0 0 0 
2 10 0 0 0 0 0 
3 10 0 0 0 0 0 
4 10 0 0 0 0  
5 10  0 0 0  
 
50% 
 
TABLE VII. FIVE MIDDLE (5) INPUTS FOR LAYER ONE AND LAYER 
TWO AND HIGHEST (10) INPUTS FOR LAYER THREE. 
Layer Two Layer Three 
Co
m
p 
Layer 
One 
URL & 
Domain   
Security 
& 
Encrypt 
Source 
Code & 
Java  
Page 
Style & 
Contents 
Web 
Address 
Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
% 
Website 
Phishing  
Rating 
1 5 5 5 10 10 10
2 5 5 5 10 10 10
3 5 5 5 10 10 10
4 5 5 5 10 10  
5 5  5 10 10  
 
65% 
 
TABLE VIII. FIVE MIDDLE (5) INPUTS FOR LAYER ONE AND ALL 
OTHERS LOWEST (0) INPUTS. 
Layer Two Layer Three 
Co
m
p 
Layer 
One 
URL & 
Domain  
Security 
& 
Encrypt 
Source 
Code & 
Java  
Page 
Style & 
Contents 
Web 
Address 
Bar 
Social 
Human 
Factor 
% 
Website 
Phishing  
Rating 
1 5 0 0 0 0 0 
2 5 0 0 0 0 0 
3 5 0 0 0 0 0 
4 5 0 0 0 0  
5 5  0 0 0  
 
35% 
 
    Table VIII show that when the Layer one of the phishing 
website risk criteria (URL & Domain Identity) has middle (5) 
input values which indicate Mod. phishing indicator and all 
other Layers has the value of zero input values which indicate 
Low phishing indicator, the final phishing website risk rating 
will be reasonably low (35%) representing a “legitimate 
website”, which means that there is Good guarantee that the 
website is legitimate website. This result clearly shows that 
even if some of the website phishing characteristics or layers 
are noticed or observed, that does not mean at all that the 
website is phishy or forged, but it can be safe and secured 
especially when other phishing characteristics or layers are not 
noticeable, visible or detectable. The results also indicates that 
the worst website phishing rate (all three layers have 10 input 
value) equals 86.2% representing “Very Phishy Website” and 
the best website phishing rate (all three layers have 0 input 
value) is 13.8% representing “Very Legitimate Website” 
rather than a full range, i.e. 0 to 100, because of the 
fuzzification process 
 
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
     The fuzzy website phishing model showed the significance 
and importance of the phishing website criteria (URL & 
Domain Identity) represented by layer one, and also showed 
that even if some of the website phishing characteristics or 
layers are not very clear or not definite, the website can still be 
phishy especially when other phishing characteristics or layers 
are obvious and clear. On the other hand even if some of the 
website phishing characteristics or layers are noticed or 
observed, that does not mean at all that the website is phishy, 
but it can be safe and secured especially when other phishing 
characteristics or layers are not noticeable, visible or 
detectable.  As a future work we will propose and develop a 
prototype intelligent website phishing detection system by 
using Fuzzy Data Mining algorithms and techniques. The 
approach will look for deviations from stored patterns of 
normal phishing behavior and for previously described 
patterns of behavior that is likely to indicate phishing.  
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